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Transparency and Accountability in the 
Management of Oil Revenues in Ghana 
Ransford Edward Van Gyampo 
Abstract: This paper undertakes a five-year review of the management 
of oil revenues in Ghana since the commencement of oil production in 
2010. Using reports from the Petroleum Transparency and Accountabil-
ity Index, official records from key state agencies, and interviews with 
core individuals within the petroleum sector, the paper assesses the qual-
ity of transparency and accountability in the management of Ghana’s oil 
revenue. It argues that even though some progress has been made in the 
transparent and accountable use of oil revenues, more can be achieved if 
certain critical bills are passed and proactive interventions pursued with-
out further delay on the part of government and policymakers within 
Ghana’s petroleum sector. These would help prevent both potential social 
conflict that may result from a lack of information on how oil revenues 
are utilised and the corrupt use of oil funds by politicians and people in 
authority within the oil industry. 
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In 2010 Ghana commenced full-scale oil production with an initial out-
put of 25,000 barrels per day (bpd). By 2015 production reached ap-
proximately 102,000 bpd, and it is expected to hit 124,000 bpd by the 
close of 2016 (IEA-Ghana 2015).1 Oil production commenced at a time 
of rising prices. The spot price for Brent Crude was around USD 96 per 
barrel in January 2011, reaching a peak of USD 127 in May 2011 and 
another peak of USD 128 per barrel in March 2012 (Republic of Ghana 
2013). Although the price remained above USD 100 per barrel in 2013 
and the first half of 2014, it began to steadily decline from September 
2014, reaching a low of around USD 45 by the beginning of January 
2015 (IEA-Ghana 2015). Following a slight recovery during the first half 
of 2015, there was a precipitous slide in prices starting from August the 
same year.  
Ghana’s total petroleum receipts in 2014 were USD 978 million. 
Between 2010 and 2015, a total of USD 3.02 billion was received 
(Republic of Ghana 2015). Of this amount, 42 per cent was allocated to 
the Annual Budget Funding Amount (ABFA), 30 per cent to the Ghana 
National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), 20 per cent to the Ghana 
Stabilisation Fund (GSF), and 8 per cent to the Ghana Heritage Fund 
(GHF) (ibid.). 
Review of the Existing Literature 
Existing studies on oil in Ghana focus on how its discovery undermined 
democratic practices and institutions (Manteaw 2010), the need to man-
age citizens’ expectations regarding the impact of Ghana’s oil (Gyimah-
Boadi and Prempeh 2012), the sectoral impact of oil production in 
Ghana (Asafu-Adjaye 2010), and the need to harness Ghana’s oil and gas 
resources for sustainable development (Aryeetey, Osei, and Quartey 
2014). In the course of research, no systematic study was identified in the 
area of transparency and accountability in the management of oil 
revenues in Ghana. However, experience shows that transparency and 
accountability in managing oil revenues is critical for preventing conflict 
and the resource curse (Manteaw 2010). This is the gap in the literature 
that this study seeks to fill. Ghana has come a long way since starting oil 
production in late 2010. While production volume has been limited so 
far, there is abundant potential to increase it in the years ahead. 
Prudently, the Ghanaian parliament passed legislation in the form of the 
1  See further details at <www.myjoyonline.com/business/2016/January-28th/oil-
production-to-hit-124000-daily.php>. 
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Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA), which provides the legal 
framework for the collection, allocation, and management of petroleum 
revenue in a responsible, transparent, accountable, and sustainable 
manner for the benefit of the citizens of Ghana.  
Using reports from the Petroleum Transparency and Accountability 
(P-TRAC) Index, published by the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA-
Ghana), as the basis for research alongside interviews with key oil-sector 
officials, this study attempts to track compliance with the PRMA by key 
institutions in the management of Ghana’s oil revenue. It discusses the 
relevance of transparency and accountability initiatives (TAI), explains 
both the features and computations of the P-TRAC Index, and examines 
how Ghana has fared in terms of transparency and accountability in the 
management of its oil revenues.  
The Relevance of TAIs in the Management of 
Revenues from Natural Resources 
The concept of transparency connotes a deliberate mechanism that en-
sures public access to reliable information in a timely manner (Kolstad and 
Wiig 2009; Haufler 2010). Making such timely information easily accessible 
to the public and all stakeholders is one critical method of making gov-
ernment accountable to all of its citizenry (Haufler 2010). There are several 
international TAIs that act as catalysts for performance improvement in 
the mining and metal industry (Acosta 2013; Collier and Hoeffler 2004), 
including the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), the Publish 
What You Pay (PWYP) coalition, and the International Council on Mining 
and Metals (ICMM). In Ghana, the Extractive Industry Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) regulates the country’s gold mining.  
TAIs have a number of benefits. Indeed, without TAIs corruption 
is less risky and more attractive. In addition, if TAIs are not present, not 
only is it harder to use incentives to make public officials act ethically, 
but cooperation is more difficult to sustain and opportunistic rent-seek-
ing is more likely (Kolstad and Wiig 2009; Bellver and Kaufman 2005). 
Islam (2003) argues that improved TAIs increase a country’s credit rat-
ings, enhance fiscal discipline, and reduce corruption. Glennerster and 
Shin (2008) also find an association between greater fiscal transparency 
and accountability and improved perceptions of a country’s economic 
conditions and economic growth. Generally, improving transparency and 
accountability in the management of natural-resource revenues enables 
the citizenry to effectively scrutinise the government’s management of 
the resource in question and hold the government accountable for misuse. 
 82 Ransford Edward Van Gyampo 
Access to information regarding how oil funds are used reduces derogat-
ory perceptions that can easily spark conflict, especially when people 
believe the funds are being embezzled (Sachs and Warner 1995). The gov-
ernment also benefits from being transparent because trust is built with the 
people, while the people, meanwhile, can form realistic expectations based 
on the provision of reliable and timely information (ibid.). 
One key challenge the Ghanaian government faces with the discov-
ery of oil is how to manage the sudden increase in the hopes and aspira-
tions of its citizens (Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh 2012). One way to man-
age these expectations appropriately is to improve governance and pro-
mote the use of credible and independent TAIs in the management of 
the resource (ibid.). The urgent need for a credible and independent TAI 
to guide the management of Ghana’s oil revenue is critical given that 
opacity and the lack of accountability in the management of natural-
resource revenues are key triggers for conflicts in many African countries 
(Auty 1998).  
The P-TRAC Index is one major and independent TAI developed 
by a Ghanaian policy think tank, the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA). 
Even though initial ownership and acceptance of this initiative was lim-
ited, given its lack of national appeal, the P-TRAC Index has gained 
credibility as an independent barometer that seeks to effectively report 
on transparency and accountability issues in the use and management of 
oil revenues in Ghana (Republic of Ghana 2014).2 The usefulness of the 
P-TRAC Index compared to the other global indices, therefore, lies in 
the fact that it is a home-grown TAI developed by one of Ghana’s cred-
ible and independent think tanks, one that fully understands the local 
context as far as issues relating to transparency and accountability in the 
management of oil revenues are concerned.  
However, the challenge is that some Ghanaians sometimes prefer 
global TAIs to local ones and, thus, treat such local initiatives with con-
descension. In order for TAIs to be effective, an enlightened citizenry, 
the willingness of public officials to comply with TAIs, and the existence 
of credible sanctions to punish those who do not comply with TAIs is 
key in making TAIs effective (Kolstad and Wiig 2009). Nevertheless, the 
P-TRAC Index remains a credible local TAI for Ghana’s oil sector.3 So, 
2  Even though the EITI exists for Ghana’s gold-mining industry, the P-TRAC 
Index is hailed for its visibility and regular publication of its report and findings 
in the oil sector.  
3  Interview with Seth Terkpeh, Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, 4 Janu-
ary 2016, Accra. 
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what is the P-TRAC Index all about, and how is it computed? The next 
section provides the answers. 
The IEA–P-TRAC Index 
The P-TRAC Index was launched in 2011, designed to promote trans-
parency and accountability in the management of Ghana’s oil revenues 
and to enhance the level of responsibility on the part of policymakers 
(IEA-Ghana 2015). Published annually, the index provides both qual-
itative and quantitative indicators that are used to monitor four aspects 
of the oil value chain – namely, revenue transparency, expenditure trans-
parency, and contract transparency, as well as the management of the 
Heritage and Stabilisation Funds.4 In computing the index, data is 
collected with the aid of a detailed questionnaire on its four main 
components: 
1. Revenue transparency (RT) – In measuring RT, the P-TRAC Index 
looks at the availability,5 quality,6 and frequency7 of published re-
ports, as well as the appropriateness of the institutional environ-
ment8 for the management of the oil revenue. The reports are ex-
4  Interview with Jean Mensa, Executive Director of the Institute of Economic 
Affairs, 4 January 2016, Accra. 
5 In measuring the availability of reports, questions are asked about the extent to 
which reports on the management of oil revenues are available to the public. 
Responses are scored from “0” to “5,” with “0” suggesting that reports are not 
available to the public and “5” denoting that the reports are publicly available. 
6 In measuring the quality of reports, two main questions are posed. The first 
rates quality on a scale of “0” to “5,” where “0” indicates that the reports are 
not easily understandable to the average citizen and a score of “5” means the 
reports are very understandable. The second question rates report quality on 
the basis of how comprehensive it is, with “0” denoting not comprehensive 
and “5” denoting highly comprehensive. 
7 The PRMA stipulates monthly, quarterly, and annual reporting for the various 
agencies involved in the management of oil revenue. In measuring the frequency 
of reports, ten questions are posed. Each question is assessed on a scale of “0” to 
“3,” with “0” for no reports generated whatsoever and “3” for monthly or quar-
terly reports. The first question seeks to find out how often reports are provided 
on revenue generated by the appropriate agencies of state in the oil sector. The 
remaining questions elicit information on the frequency of reports on reserves, 
production volumes, prices, exports, royalties, taxes, dividends, and costs. 
8 In measuring the quality of the institutional environment, eight key questions 
are posed. The first question assesses whether the policy, regulatory, and com-
mercial roles in the oil sector are shared among separate state agencies on a 
scale of “0” to “5,” with “0” representing no division of roles whatsoever and 
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pected to capture the nation’s oil reserves; revenues from oil; the ef-
fectiveness of laws regulating the oil sector; and the governance and 
activities of the GNPC, the main state-owned industry in charge of 
the oil sector (IEA-Ghana 2015).  
2. Expenditure transparency (ET) – The main avenue for channelling the 
state’s share of the oil revenues is through the budget in the form of 
Annual Budget Funding Amount (ABFA) (Terkpeh 2016).9 The 
same approach used in assessing RT is used to measure ET. In this 
regard, the index looks at the availability, frequency, and quality of 
reports on expenditures undertaken from the oil revenues. How oil 
revenues are spent is also critically interrogated, and emphasis is 
placed prominently on the number and distribution of infrastruc-
tural projects undertaken, the extent to which they contribute to 
poverty reduction, the role of parliament in ratifying these expend-
itures, and the role of CSOs and industry groups in the oversight of 
the expenditure programme. Again, a 6-point scale is used and indi-
vidual scores are averaged to obtain an overall average for ET.10 
3. Contract transparency (CT) – In determining CT, the index examines 
transparency in the awarding of contracts in the oil sector by posing 
a series of nine critical questions. The first question attempts to as-
certain the existence of rules for the disclosure of contract infor-
mation; this is followed by a question on whether such contract in-
                                                                                                    
“5” suggesting excellent division of roles. The second question elicits informa-
tion about the existence of laws that cover the entire decision-making processes 
of oil development, while the third question asks whether the government has 
published this legislation. For all of the aforementioned questions, there is a 6-
point scale, where a score of “0” represents no legislation whatsoever and “5” 
represents extensive and well-known legislation. The fourth question asks 
whether the Bank of Ghana, the agency mandated to receive payments from oil 
companies, has internal controls that monitor assets and prevent fraud. The 
fifth question checks whether there is an external arrangement that indepen-
dently validates the internal control mechanisms of the Bank of Ghana. The 
next question enquires whether there is an independent audit outside the Bank 
of Ghana, while the seventh question ascertains the role of parliament in re-
viewing reports on revenues accruing from the oil sector. Finally, the eighth 
question evaluates the oversight and watchdog role of civil society in ensuring 
proper management of oil revenues. As with the first three questions, a 6-point 
scale is adopted for the five remaining questions, where “0” means none or no 
role and “5” means a crucial role. 
9 See the Petroleum Revenue Management Act.  
10  Interview with Jean Mensa, Executive Director of the Institute of Economic 
Affairs, 4 January 2016, Accra. 
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formation is available to the public. The third question seeks to find 
out whether the government provides and publishes contract in-
formation during the licensing process, while the fourth question 
enquires whether reports on the assessments of the expected envi-
ronmental and social impact of oil and gas projects are published. 
Question five asks whether the authority in charge of granting li-
cences and awarding contracts for oil production is independent of 
the state-owned GNPC, while the sixth question asks whether the 
licensing process is open and competitive to all interested compa-
nies. The seventh question enquires whether there are legislations 
and licensing processes that limit the use of discretion by the au-
thority in charge of awarding contracts. This is followed by a ques-
tion on the role of parliament in ratifying oil contracts. The last 
question seeks to determine whether there is an appeal process on 
licensing decisions. These questions are scored on a scale of “0” to 
“5,” where “0” represents total non-agreement and “5” represents 
total agreement with the statement (IEA-Ghana 2015). 
4. Managing the Heritage and Stabilisation Funds under the PRMA – The 
final set of questions relates to the management of the Heritage and 
Stabilisation Funds, established by the PRMA. Four main questions 
are posed here: The first seeks to determine whether the rules gov-
erning the funds, including regulations on how the instrument is 
funded and rules for disbursements, are publicly available. The sec-
ond asks whether the agency in charge of the funds publishes in-
formation regarding both how the funds are being used and their 
performance. The third question seeks to determine whether the fi-
nancial reports are audited, while the final asks whether the audited 
reports on the funds are published. Responses to these questions 
are scored from “0” to “5,” where “0” represents total non-agree-
ment and “5” represents total agreement with the statement. 
Tracking Transparency and Accountability in 
the Management of Oil Funds 
This section presents an analysis of the quality of transparency and ac-
countability in the management of oil revenues in Ghana from 2010 
through 2015.11 The overall P-TRAC score increased from 60 per cent in 
11  The P-TRAC was launched in 2011, and 2015 marks exactly five years of oil pro-
duction in Ghana. 
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2011 to 83 per cent in 2015. This is indicative of progress in transpar-
ency and accountability in the oil sector. In general, there has been 
steady progress in three of the four areas of the index – namely, revenue, 
expenditure, and the management of the Heritage and Stabilisation 
Funds. However, there was stagnation in the area of contract transpar-
ency. Detailed discussions are presented below.  
Revenue Transparency (RT)  
The P-TRAC reports from 2011 through 201512 show that the Ministry 
of Finance published petroleum receipts in the Gazette and in at least two 
state-owned daily newspapers on a quarterly basis, as required by Section 
8 of the PRMA. However, the Ghana Revenue Authority has no data on 
taxes collected from petroleum since production began in 2010, and it 
appears that the political will to provide this information is lacking 
(Republic of Ghana 2014). The PRMA is a major piece of legislation 
contributing to the maintenance of transparency and accountability on 
the part of government (Banful 2010), but the act alone is not sufficient 
to guarantee transparency. Other bills such as the Right to Information 
Bill (RTI bill) and the Petroleum Exploration and Production Bill (PEPB), 
could help give full meaning to the PRMA. The RTI bill allows the gen-
eral public access to data held by national governments at a minimal cost, 
barring standard exceptions.13 The PEPB includes, among other things, 
several strong governance provisions, such as a public petroleum register 
and, importantly, an open and competitive bidding process, which has 
the potential to help Ghana achieve the best deals for its petroleum re-
source.14 Speedy passage of these bills would significantly help to im-
prove transparency and accountability in the industry.  
In Ghana, civil society has played a vibrant role in pushing hard for 
RT (IEA-Ghana 2015). However, civil society must intensify its efforts to 
educate Ghanaians about their role in keeping government honest in order 
to ensure transparency and accountability in oil-revenue management. 
Expenditure Transparency (ET) 
Typically, the information provided in the budgets since 2010 includes 
the total amount allocated to each of the four priority areas, while a list 
12  The IEA did not publish a P-TRAC report in 2013. 
13  See details of the bill at <www.parliament.gh/publications/36/629>. 
14  See details of the bill at <www.reportingoilandgas.org/ghanas-petroleum-explo 
ration-and-production-bill-steps-forward-but-room-for-improvement>. 
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of projects is provided in an appendix.15 However, the information pro-
vided does not give details on the locations of the projects being under-
taken, nor is information on the level or degree of their completion in-
cluded (IEA-Ghana 2015). To be fair, it is understandable that providing 
this amount of information may not be feasible in the budget documents 
due to space limitations. To that end, a separate publication on revenues 
accruing from oil and how it was spent is recommended. In 2015 the 
Ministry of Finance published a “citizen’s budget”: the budget presented 
in simple language.16 Unfortunately, there was no reporting on petro-
leum (IEA-Ghana 2015). The cause of ET would be better advanced if 
future editions of the novel practice of rewriting the budget in simple 
language devote some space to informing the public about expenditures 
from the ABFA. 
A key aspect of ET is assessment of the allocation, distribution, and 
developmental impacts of projects funded under the ABFA. The 2015 
PIAC report (Republic of Ghana 2015)17 states that the infrastructure 
projects are spread thinly across the country and that many projects are 
still incomplete, even after several years of construction. It is also the 
case that the allocations to certain projects constitute a tiny percentage of 
the total ABFA, which makes the possible developmental impact hard to 
determine (IEA-Ghana 2015). In the view of the finance minister, every 
part of the country must benefit from the investment projects being 
undertaken with the nation’s oil revenue.18 However, the fact that 
projects remain uncompleted is indicative of insufficient funding, poor 
monitoring, or a combination of both. All these issues point to the fact 
that the current method of allocating and distributing the ABFA is not 
satisfactory and may not achieve the intended development impacts. In 
the absence of a long-term national development plan to provide specific 
direction on how the funds should be allocated, this study advocates the 
formation of a committee with representation from all major stake-
holders to work with the Ministry of Finance on an appropriate expend-
iture programme.  
15  See 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 Budget Statements and Economic Poli-
cies of Ghana, available at <www.mofep.gov.gh>. 
16  Interview with Cassiel Forson, Deputy Minister of Finance and Economic 
Planning, 20 April 2016, Accra. 
17  The Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC) is a citizens-led statu-
tory body established under Section 51 of the Petroleum Revenue Management 
Act (Act 815) to provide additional non-parliamentary and independent oversight 
over the collection and utilization of Ghana’s petroleum revenues. 
18  Interview with Seth Terkpeh, Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, 4 Janu-
ary, 2016, Accra. 
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Contract Transparency (CT) 
The outcome of this research indicates the availability of information on 
some petroleum agreements (PAs) on the websites of the Ministry of 
Petroleum and GNPC (IEA-Ghana 2015). However, the reports and in-
formation on these websites are woefully inadequate. On the issue of 
awarding licences, the government currently negotiates in private with 
interested parties and does not disclose information about the process (Re-
public of Ghana 2015). The reason given is the high risk of exploitation 
associated with unproven fields that can best be addressed through ne-
gotiations.19 Even though there is no legal obligation for the government 
to disclose the full details of contracts and agreements, the tenets of demo-
cratic governance require that responsible and accountable governments 
“let the people know what is happening”.20 Given that corrupt deals 
benefitting politicians thrive in opacity, there appears to be little or no 
commitment to ensuring CT, which explains why the RTI bill has not 
been passed as of 2016.21 This study recommends that, to further enhance 
transparency in the industry, the government must disclose information 
not only on contracts and licences but also on the criteria for doing so. In 
this regard, the passage of the RTI bill into law would be an important 
catalyst in promoting transparency and accountability in Ghana’s oil sector. 
The Heritage and Stabilisation Funds  
(Ghana Petroleum Funds, GPF) 
The GPFs comprise the Ghana Heritage Fund (GHF) and the Ghana 
Stabilisation Fund (GSF). The aim of the GHF is to support develop-
ment for future generations after the petroleum resources are exhausted, 
while the GSF is meant to sustain public expenditure during periods of 
unanticipated shortfalls in petroleum revenue. Transparency in the man-
agement of the GPFs has been high.22 Over the years, information on 
activities of the GPFs is regularly reported. This includes information on 
the performance of the funds, regular auditing of the funds, and 
publication of the audit reports (IEA-Ghana 2015). 
19  Interview with Cassiel Forson, Deputy Minister of Finance and Economic 
Planning, 20 April 2016, Accra. 
20  Interview with Jean Mensa, Executive Director of the Institute of Economic 
Affairs, 4 January 2016, Accra. 
21  Ibid. 
22  Interview with Seth Terkpeh, Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, 4 Janu-
ary 2016, Accra. 
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During the 2014 budget session of parliament, the Ministry of Fi-
nance sought permission to place a cap of USD 250 million on the GSF, 
in line with Section 23(3) of the PRMA, which was subsequently ap-
proved by Parliament.23 In the Budget Statement for 2015, approval was 
sought to raise the cap on the GSF in the first quarter of 2015 to USD 
300 million. The excess funds were to be put into a sinking fund to pay 
off government debt, and the remainder was to be deposited in a 
contingency fund.24 Although the above decisions of the finance minister 
do not contravene the PRMA, the minister’s discretionary powers are of 
serious concern, particularly if no input whatsoever is sought from the 
relevant stakeholders. The GPFs run the potential risk of being diverted 
from the core objectives of the PRMA if the discretionary powers of the 
minister are not constrained. 
Summary and Conclusion 
The discovery of abundant natural resources has led to strife in many 
African countries, including Congo-Brazzaville, Nigeria, Equatorial 
Guinea, Sudan, and Chad, for several reasons. These include the fact that 
regimes have failed to manage revenues accruing from natural resources 
in a transparent and accountable manner. This has often led to an in-
cumbency advantage and political instability that have resulted in incum-
bent governments adopting more repressive policies towards the oppo-
sition (Wantchekon 2002). Ghana has come a long way since starting oil 
production in 2010. Unlike other African countries, Ghana is fortunate 
to have put in place the PRMA, which guides the management of the 
petroleum revenues. In assessing the quality of transparency and ac-
countability in the management of Ghana’s oil revenue, one can say 
without equivocation that progress has been made. However, the success 
of TAIs depends on other policies because TAIs are necessary but insuf-
ficient to reduce the challenges in the management of oil revenues. In 
this regard, all policy proposals made in this study must be carried out 
without further delay as a way of boosting transparency and accountabil-
ity in the management of oil revenues in Ghana. 
23  Interview with Seth Terkpeh, Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, 4 Janu-
ary 2016, Accra. 
24  Ibid. 
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Transparenz und Rechenschaftspflicht bei der Verwaltung der 
ghanaischen Erdöleinnahmen 
Zusammenfassung: Der Autor untersucht die Verwaltung der Erdöl-
einnahmen in Ghana während der ersten fünf Jahre seit Beginn der För-
derung im Jahr 2010. Seine Analyse beruht auf Berichten des Petroleum 
Transparency and Accountability Index, amtlichen Dokumenten wichtiger 
staatlicher Stellen und Interviews mit Persönlichkeiten des Ölsektors. Er 
konzediert zwar Fortschritte in Richtung auf eine transparente und ver-
antwortliche Nutzung der Erdöleinnahmen, aus seiner Sicht könnte aller-
dings deutlich mehr erreicht werden, wenn entscheidende Gesetzesvorha-
ben umgesetzt würden und Staat und Politiker proaktiv und ohne Verzö-
gerung im Erdölsektor intervenieren würden. Das könne zur Vermeidung 
gesellschaftlicher Konflikte beitragen, die aufgrund mangelnder Informa-
tion über die Verwendung der Erdöleinnahmen entstehen könnten, sowie 
zur Verhütung korrupter Praktiken durch Politiker und Verantwortliche 
im Erdölsektor. 
Schlagwörter: Ghana, Erdöl, Öffentliche Einnahmen, Verteilungspolitik, 
Gute Regierungsführung 
